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Public finance experts have long explored
the issue of income taxes making the cost of
market transactions higher than nonmarket
ones. A 50 percent income tax, for example,
requires $20,000 in income to purchase $10,000
of market goods. The tax can be avoided, how-
ever, if the same goods can be produced at
home. The upshot is that income taxes encour-
age the home production of goods and services
that would otherwise be produced and traded
in the market. By restricting trade between indi-
viduals, income taxes reduce what Adam Smith
considered one of the primary benefits of the
marketplace—the gains to specialization. 
Given that income taxes reduce speciali-
zation within an economy, it is easy to see 
the similarities between the taxing of income
within a country and tariff barriers between
countries: income taxes encourage individuals
to trade less in the marketplace and produce
more goods at home; tariffs cause countries to
trade less internationally and produce more
domestically. Moreover, just as tariffs can redis-
tribute income across countries, flat income tax
rates can redistribute income across skill
groups. Over a range of positive flat income
taxes (tit-for-tat tariffs), raising taxes may actu-
ally benefit large groups of similarly skilled
individuals (large countries) and hurt the small
groups (small countries). Other insights into the
effects of income taxation can also be eluci-
dated from tariff theory. As in tariff theory, the
costs of income taxes are small only if they 
succeed in raising revenue; thus, it seriously
harms an economy to be on the downward 
portion of the tax revenue (Laffer) curve. The
larger the value of market income (trade) com-
pared with total production (gross domestic
product)—that is, the more heterogeneous the
society—the higher the income tax rate that
maximizes revenue.
This article explores the parallel between
the standard theory of income taxation and the
theory of tariffs in international trade. Indeed,
there is no formal difference in economic theory
between a tariff war among countries and a flat-
rate personal income tax within an economy.
But although analysts generally consider tariff
wars extremely costly to economic activity, they
often look on income taxes with complacency.
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One possible reason for these different reac-
tions is that tariff wars are explicitly used to
inflict damage on another country, whereas
income taxes are used primarily to finance pub-
lic spending. This article looks at how insights
from the theory of tariffs can help us understand
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T his article explores 
the parallel between the 
standard theory of income
taxation and the theory of tariffs
in international trade. Insights
from the theory of tariffs help us
understand how income taxes
undercut the very basis on 
which people gain from 
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HOME PRODUCTION AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
As noted above, income taxes shift pro-
duction from market work to home production.
Eisner (1989) estimates that the total value of
U.S. home production ranges from 20 percent to
50 percent of measured output (GDP). In
Sweden, a country with one of the highest 
marginal income tax rates in the world, home
production accounts for an even larger part of
domestic output. Swedish men, for example,
averaged more than four hours per week on
home improvement activities in 1984. In con-
trast, U.S. men averaged 2.8 hours and Japanese
men less than one hour a week ( Juster and
Stafford 1991).
2 Trade theorist Ivor Pearce suc-
cinctly sums up the effect of taxes on the divi-
sion of labor:
The striking growth of do-it-yourself activ-
ity in recent years is neither an accident
nor a change in basic preferences. Tax is
avoided on work for self. Work for an
employer is heavily taxed. The cheapest
way to get something done is to do 
it yourself, contrary to the principle of 
the division of labor on which our high
present standards of living depend. The
whole structure of industry is deeply
affected (Pearce 1977, 105–6).
The effect of income taxes on home pro-
duction and market specialization has not gone
unnoticed in economics. Boskin (1975) com-
bines the household sector with a market sec-
tor to examine taxes in a general equilibrium
framework. His two-sector model includes cap-
ital and labor as factors of production, but
labor is untaxed in the household sector. Apps
(1981, 1982) uses the analogy of trade theory
to examine inequality issues that arise when
certain groups of individuals are excluded
from the market sector. Sandmo (1990) ex-
plicitly shows the similarities between income
taxes and tariffs in his examination of optimum
tax structures in a Becker-style model (Becker
1965) of household production. Sandmo notes
that when household production is included,
production efficiency is no longer feasible
because “taxes on households are in fact tariffs
on their trade with the rest of the economy”
(Sandmo 1990, 89). In his framework, how-
ever, it is assumed that households must make
market purchases, so the household equivalent
of international autarky is ruled out. Extensive
work on household production and taxation
can be found in the literature on real-business-
cycle theory. In McGrattan, Rogerson, and
Wright (1997), for example, private consump-
tion goods come from market and nonmarket
production. Nonmarket goods are produced
from domestic capital and labor allocated to
home production. Because real-business-cycle
models typically assume a representative agent,
they cannot analyze how taxes affect indi-
viduals with different skills, which this article
examines.
In international trade theory, home pro-
duction is not tied to any good or sector; it is
simply anything produced domestically. In tax
models, however, a separate household sector
typically produces only household goods dis-
tinct from those produced in the market sec-
tor. Consequently, in representative agent tax 
models, putting high income taxes on market
transactions may reduce the market sector’s
size and change relative prices, but it will not
generate the contrasting experiences of differ-
ent individuals and the autarkic tendencies of
tariff theory.
In the real world, nearly all households
produce cleaning, cooking, entertainment, trans-
portation, repair, and many other services. While
relatively few goods may be produced at home,
households’ purchase of durable goods (refrig-
erators, computers, stoves, lawnmowers, and so
on) enables the production of many services.
Because of the tremendous diversity in skills
and behavior, households cannot be treated as
a single representative agent. Households will
respond differently to income taxes, just as
countries respond differently to tariffs. Thus,
departing from the approach of Sandmo (1990)
and McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1997),
we do not set out a separate household sector
or identify a unique household good. All pro-
duction can be consumed at home or “ex-
ported” to the market.
The results of this approach show effects
normally not associated with income taxes.
Over some range of positive flat income taxes,
raising tax rates may benefit a relatively large
sector of an economy at the expense of a
smaller sector. For example, if manufacturing is
the largest sector in an economy, it may benefit
from a flat income tax at the expense of agri-
culture. In a two-person economy, the high-
income individual may benefit at the expense of
the low-income individual. This is similar to tar-
iff theory, in which large countries may gain
from tariffs at the expense of small countries.
Flat income taxes, in essence, can boost some
economic sectors at the expense of others and
dramatically reduce specialization within an4
economy. Representative agent models over-
look this aspect because they treat everyone as
identical. In the real world, each household
activity competes with its counterpart in the
market economy. Taxes that shift activity away
from the market will have redistributional
effects outside the purview of representative
agent models.
As in tariff theory, the costs of income
taxes are small only if they succeed in raising
revenue; thus, it is very costly for an economy
to be on the downward side of the tax revenue
(Laffer) curve.
We also examine the effects of income
taxes on general welfare. Here we find that the
impact of income taxes depends in a complex
way on the heterogeneity of the society.
INCOME TAX THEORY
To consider the theory of income taxation
in a heterogeneous agent economy, suppose
there are two agents, households 1 and 2, pro-
ducing two goods, 1 and 2. Each household can
produce and consume both goods, one of
which is “imported” and the other “exported.”
Comparative advantage determines which good
the household exports (sells) and which it
imports (buys). Household i produces and con-
sumes amounts xi
j and  ci
j of each good j.




and its production transformation function is
(2) T i(x i
1, x i
2) = ki.
This implicit function shows the maximum out-
put of one good given the output of the other.
The function is set equal to the constant ki,
reflecting household i’s fixed endowments of
capital and labor. The subscript j on a function
denotes the partial derivative. Thus, ui
j denotes
household i’s marginal utility of good j.
Applying the implicit function rule to Equations
1 and 2, we let MRS
i = ui
2/ui




1 denote the marginal rates of substitution
in consumption and transformation in produc-
tion, with T i
j denoting household i’s marginal
resource cost of good j. Since only relative
prices matter, we let p denote the market price
of good 2 in terms of good 1. As a convention,
we suppose agent 1 (agent 2) always sells good
1 (good 2) and buys good 2 (good 1).
Because taxing household production or
consumption is not feasible (imagine trying to
tax home cooking or parents’ caring for their
children), we assume the government imposes
taxes only on market transactions. These taxes
are essentially income (or, equivalently, sales)
taxes. We examine the effects of an income tax,
t, levied ad valorem on each household as a
proportion of its net dollar sales, or market
income. As a benchmark for the analysis, we
assume all income tax receipts, R i, are directly
rebated to each household in the amount paid
to the government, but each household treats
this as a lump-sum amount independent of any
decision the household might make. This device
allows us to investigate the distortionary effects
of taxation per se, exclusive of the effect of
resources absorbed by government.
Each household converts domestic pro-
duction into domestic consumption through
market transactions. Each household’s lump-
sum tax receipts plus net income (after taxes)
must equal market expenditures. Thus, the bud-
get constraints of households are
(3) R 1 + (x 1
1 – c1
1)(1 – t) = p(c1
2 – x 1
2),
(tax receipts for household 1 + income 
from selling good 1 = purchases of good 2)
and
(4) R 2 + (x 2
2 – c2
2)p(1 – t) = (c2
1 – x 2
1).
(tax receipts for household 2 + income 
from selling good 2 = purchases of good 1)
Household 1 chooses (x1
j, c1
j) to maximize the
Lagrangian
L 1 = u1(•) + lT 1(•) + m[R 1 + (x 1
1 – c1
1)(1 – t) 
– p(c1
2 – x 1
2)],
which yields the first-order conditions
(5) MRS 1 = MRT 1 = p/(1 – t).
Household 2 chooses production and consump-
tion to maximize
L 2 = u2(•) + lT 2(•) + l[R 2 + (x 2
2 – c2
2)p(1 – t) 
– (c2
1 – x 2
1)],
yielding
(6) MRS 2 = MRT 2 = p(1 – t).
The remaining equations are the transfor-
mation function (Equation 2) and market clearing:
(7) Sici
2 = Six i
2.
We rebate to each household the exact revenue
collected by the government. That is,
(8) R 1 = t(x 1
1 – c1
1);
(9) R 2 = tp(x 2
2 – c2
2).
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and 4, respectively, yields the tax-free budget
constraints
(10) x i




Equations 2, 5, 6, 7, and 10 consist of nine
equations and nine variables for determining
the levels of household production, consump-
tion, and p.
TARIFF THEORY
This section summarizes the traditional
theory of tariffs (see Jones 1969; Ruffin 1979) in
a form that is useful for comparison with in-
come tax theory and in a way that parallels our
development of the theory of income taxation.
Countries 1 and 2 produce goods 1 and 2,
respectively. Country i exports good i. The
world price of good 2 in terms of good 1 is p.
The domestic relative price of good 2 is pi.
Country i imposes the ad valorem tariff rate ti
on the point-of-origin price (Lerner 1936). Since
country 1 imports good 2, the domestic price of
good 2 is higher than the foreign price:
(11) p1 = p(1 + t 1).
Since country 2 exports good 2, the domestic
relative price is lower than the world price:
(12) p2 = p/(1 + t 2).
Substituting households for countries, we can
use the same notation as before for describing
utility in country i and production possibilities.
We make the usual assumption in tariff
theory that all tax revenues are redistributed in
lump-sum form to consumers. We could pro-
ceed as before, but note that this assumption 
is automatically captured if the rates of substi-
tution and transformation are set equal to the
domestic price ratio and the value of exports
equals the value of imports at world prices, or,
equivalently, the value of production equals the
value of consumption at world prices. Thus, the
fundamental equations of tariff theory are:
(13) x i




(14) MRS 1 = MRT 1 = p(1 + t1);
(15) MRS 2 = MRT 2 = p/(1 + t2);
(16) Sici
2 = Six i
2;
(17) T i(•) = 0.
Equation 13 describes the spending con-
straints, Equations 14 and 15 set out the private
optimization conditions, Equation 16 gives the
market-clearing conditions, and Equation 17 re-
lates the supply constraints. There are nine
independent equations (two each for Equations
13, 14, 15, and 17) to solve for the nine vari-
ables. Table 1 compares the theory of income
taxation with the theory of tariffs. It is obvious
that they are formally equivalent provided
(18) (1 + ti) = 1/(1 – t).
The theory of tariffs can thus be interpreted as
the theory of sales taxation if countries are seen
as households.
3
Income taxes work heavily against market
production because they act like reciprocal tar-
iffs, which impose the same tariff rate on each
country. Table 2 uses Equation 18 to show the
reciprocal tariff equivalents for different income
tax rates. While a 10 percent income tax is the
same as an 11 percent reciprocal tariff (each
country imposes the same tariff), an income tax
of 33.33 percent is like a reciprocal tariff of 50
percent. A 50 percent income tax is equivalent
to a 100 percent tariff. In the parlance of tariff
theory, income taxation has potentially large
antispecialization effects. Income taxes are, in
effect, a government-sponsored tit-for-tat tariff
war between individuals.
Table 1
Tariff Theory Versus Income Tax Theory
Tariff theory Income tax theory
MRS
1 = MRT
1 = p(1 + t
1) MRS
1 = MRT
1 = p/(1 – t)
MRS
2 = MRT
2 = p/(1 + t
2) MRS
2 = MRT
2 = p(1 – t)
￿ici
2 = ￿ix i
2 ￿ici
2 = ￿ix i
2
x i
1 + px i
2 = c i
1 + pci
2 x i
1 + px i




















In this section we analyze the welfare
implications of income taxes in the same way
economists examine tariff theory (see Jones
1969). As a benchmark for the analysis, we con-
tinue to assume all income tax receipts are
directly rebated to each household in the
amount paid to the government. E i
j = ci
j – x i
j is
household  i’s excess demand for good j. In
market equilibrium, one household’s excess
demand will just offset another household’s
excess supply. Use pi = MRS i = MRT i to denote
household i’s opportunity cost in terms of good
2. Household i’s change in real income is
defined as
(19) dy i = dc i
1 + pidc i
2.
Equation 19 is derived from the utility function
itself and is the total differential of utility mea-
sured in terms of the numeraire good, good 1.
We can convert the change in utility to market
variables by differentiating the budget constraint
(Equation 10) and using Equation 19, noting
that along the production transformation curve
dx i
1 + pidx i
2 = 0. Thus,
(20) dy i = (pi – p)dE i
2 – E i
2dp.
This well-known equation in trade theory also
applies to households. If household i is a net
buyer of good 2 (that is, imports good 2
because pi > p), the change in welfare is the
household’s personal profit, (pi –  p)dE i
2, on
additional purchases minus the increase in the
cost of previous purchases, E i
2dp.
We first use Equation 20 to show that suf-
ficiently high taxes always reduce welfare.
Suppose taxes are so high that each household
is driven to autarky (E i
2 = 0). Working backward
from autarky, we see that welfare increases as
taxes are reduced:
dy i ‰ E i
2 = 0 = (pi – p)dE i
2 > 0.
This inequality follows from Equation 20
because initially E i
2 = 0 and dE i
2 > 0 when taxes
are reduced. In other words, welfare falls as we
increase taxes and approach autarky.
Another result is that increases in income
taxes are the most costly when the economy 
is on the downward side of the tax revenue
(Laffer) curve. Without loss of generality, we
can look at household 2, where (p2 –  p) = 
–pt. Taxes paid (and rebated) to this household
are R 2 = (p2 – p)E 2
2. The change in revenue is
(21) dR 2 = (p2 – p)dE 2
2 + (dp2 – dp)E 2
2.
Substituting Equation 20 into Equation 21 yields
(22) dy 2 = dR 2 – dp 2E 2
2.
Any increase in t will reduce the net price
of good 2 to household 2 when it sells the good
in the market, so dp 2 < 0. Because household 2
is a net seller of good 2, its excess demand for
the good is negative, so the second term in
Equation 22 is negative (the product of three
negatives). This shows that when there is any
change in income taxes and tax payments are
rebated in a lump sum, welfare can only
increase if the lump-sum payment increases. In
other words, increments in the income tax hurt
the most when the economy is on the down-
ward side of the tax revenue function. If tax rev-
enues are maximized at, say, t = 0.2, doubling
t from 0.05 to 0.1 will have a smaller impact on
welfare than increasing t from 0.2 to 0.25. 
The most interesting implication of
Equation 20 is that an equal change in income
taxes across all households will not necessarily
affect everyone in the same manner. In our
model, taxation causes each individual to pro-
duce less of the good he or she sells. But taxa-
tion can also change the relative price of goods,
which benefits one household and hurts the
other. This differential impact arises from the
ambiguous effect a change in the income tax
rate, t, can have on the terms of trade, p. As
income taxes are raised, the terms-of-trade
effects are ambiguous because the offer curves
of both households shift inward. If households
are asymmetrical in terms of their production
possibilities and preferences, the terms of trade
will change as the offer curves shift inward at
different rates, and the relative price of one
good will most likely increase. For example, an
income tax may lower a plumber’s demand for
doctors’ services proportionately more or less
than it lowers a doctor’s demand for plumbers’
services.
Thus, when households are not sym-
metrically different, some will experience an
improvement in their terms of trade and find
their welfare increasing over a range of income
taxes. Just as a large country can gain at the
expense of a small one by imposing an optimal
tariff to improve its terms of trade, some house-
holds may gain at the expense of others when
income taxes are imposed. The proof of this
proposition is straightforward. Starting from
zero income taxes, (pi – p) = 0, Equation 20
shows that a household experiencing an
improvement in the terms of trade from income
taxes (dp < 0 and E i
2 > 0, or, dp > 0 and E i
2 < 0)
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(23) dy i ‰ t = 0 = –E i
2dp > 0.
Likewise, the household that experiences a
deterioration in its terms of trade will find its
welfare declines: dy i ‰ t = 0 < 0. Equation 23
shows that a small tax improves the welfare of
the party whose terms of trade improve. This is
because E 1
2 + E 2
2 = 0, so that facing the same
change in market price, dp, one household is
better off and the other worse off.
4
Thus, we see that a sufficiently small
income tax of the sort being considered (tax
rebated in a lump sum) will usually help some
groups. Which groups will benefit? The answer
can be found by looking at income taxes as tit-
for-tat tariff wars. It is easy to see that large
countries will win a matching tariff war: they
can improve their terms of trade because they
have a larger impact on world prices. A similar
result obtains here. In the case of flat income
taxes, the consumer with the higher income will
benefit from higher taxes over a certain range.
Say the high-income person sells financial ser-
vices to a low-income person in return for
painting. Starting from a zero flat income tax
rate, increasing tax rates will raise the market
price of both financial services and painting.
The high-income person will demand less paint-
ing, and the low-income person will demand
fewer financial services. However, because the
high-income person consumes relatively more
painting than the low-income person consumes
financial services, the relative demand for paint-
ing will fall more than that of financial services.
The high-income person’s demand falls by more
because a higher income essentially means 
that demand curves are flatter (all else equal).
Therefore, the price of painting should fall rela-
tive to financial services. At the margin, starting
from no taxes, this benefits the high-income
person and hurts the low-income one. This
result of our model should not be interpreted as
meaning that in the real world income taxes
hurt low-income people more than high-income
people. This result applies to larger similarly
skilled  groups  versus smaller ones. Thus, if high-
income individuals in the real world represent 
a small share of total production and if their 
comparative advantage overlaps little with that
of low-income individuals, flat income taxes
would affect them more adversely.
Figures 1, 2, and 3 show some illustrative
calculations for several hypothetical economies
(see the box entitled “Model Description” for a
characterization of the hypothetical economies).
It is assumed that the utility and product trans-
formation functions display a constant elasticity
of substitution. Figure 1 shows a typical case in
which household 2’s income is roughly twice
that of household 1. As income taxes are in-
creased, household 2’s utility rises while that of
household 1 falls. Indeed, household 2’s real
income is maximized when the tax rate is
approximately 13 percent, and its real income
does not fall below that associated with no
taxes until the tax rate is 25 percent. Thus, the
redistribution effects can be significant.
Figures 2 and 3 consider the case of equal-
income households. In Figure 2 the households
are largely homogenous, with small differences
in their comparative advantages. In Figure 3 the
households are distinctly heterogeneous. In the
symmetrical cases the utility of each household
behaves in the same way. As the income tax
increases, nothing happens to the market price
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Utilitylose about 20 percent of the welfare they would
have with no income taxes.
CONCLUSION
Traditionally, income taxes have been
seen as lowering society’s output through the
household’s labor–leisure trade-off. Income
taxes lower the after-tax wage rate and thus
encourage people to work less and enjoy more
leisure. However, income taxes also reduce the
degree to which individuals specialize in mar-
ket activity, which is similar to the way coun-
tries respond to tariffs in international trade.
Income taxes discourage individuals from spe-
cializing in activities that reflect their com-
parative advantage. Instead, they encourage
everyone to become a jack-of-all-trades. In so
doing, income taxes may have their most dis-
torting effects not by encouraging individuals to
work less but by causing them to spend more
time working at endeavors in which their tal-
ents do not lie.
As long as it is necessary to raise revenue,
the autarkic tendencies of income taxes, sales
taxes, and value-added taxes are unavoidable.
The only solution would be to minimize them
by imposing lump-sum supplements to these
antispecialization taxes. But, as the experience
of the Thatcher government in Britain illustrates,
even small poll taxes are highly unpopular.
Income taxes are thus likely to remain the pri-
mary source of government revenue.
Nevertheless, the ways in which income
taxes affect society’s welfare must be recog-
nized. By focusing mostly on the labor–leisure
trade-off and ignoring heterogeneity in the
workforce and the potential for workers to flee
to home production, policymakers may under-
or overestimate the effect income taxes have on
various sectors of the economy and thereby tax
with unintended consequences. Just as in trade
among nations, where equal tariffs can wreak
more economic destruction in some nations
than in others, in the day-to-day commerce
within a nation even flat income taxes can have
differing deleterious effects. They affect the very
basis on which people gain from trade—the
ability to specialize.
NOTES
We thank Avinash Dixit, Joseph Haslag, Peter Miesz-
kowski, and Jason Saving for helpful comments and
suggestions.
1 Indeed, the protectionist trade war triggered by the
Smoot–Hawley tariff may have contributed significantly
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equals the reduction in demand from the other.
Real income falls from the outset; the optimal
income tax for both households is zero, as
could be expected. The revenue, or Laffer,
curve is also shown. In Figure 2 the revenue
function reaches its maximum at an income tax
of 15 percent and revenue falls to zero when
both parties are reduced to autarky (no ex-
change) with an income tax rate of 29 percent.
In the autarky case, both parties lose about 5
percent of their welfare relative to the zero
income tax position. In Figure 3, with large 
differences in comparative advantage (greater
heterogeneity), maximum revenue is achieved
at a tax rate of 30 percent, and autarky is
reached at a tax rate of 55 percent. In this case,
with taxes that choke off all trade, both parties
Model Description
The model underlying the simulations in























where r = 0.5, a = 1.5.
In Figure 1, B = 2 and k1 = 1 and k2 = 2.
In Figure 2, B = 2 and k1 = k2 = 1.
In Figure 3, B = 5 and k1 = k2 = 1.
Figure 3
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to the Great Depression. See, for example, Wanniski
(1978), Chapter 7, “The Stock Market and the Wedge,”
for a discussion of this topic.
2 Moreover, according to the same article, Swedish men
averaged 39.8 hours of market work and 18.1 of
housework (including home improvements) per week,
whereas U.S. men averaged 44 hours of market work
and 13.8 hours of housework.
3 Furthermore, we have shown that sales taxes are
equivalent to income taxes even in the presence of
household production. See Mieszkowski (1967, 251)
for a lucid statement of the equivalence of income taxes
and sales taxes in a world without home production.
4 Of course, the country as a whole is made worse off
because the terms-of-trade improvement for some
households is more than offset by the terms-of-trade
loss to the households that experience a fall in their
terms of trade. This can be demonstrated by Equation
20. Welfare is maximized when dy
1 + dy
2 = 0, which
implies that tax rates are zero.
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